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Abstract. This paper deals with the politics of redistribution in local government. Traditionally, 
it has been assumed that redistributive policies are crucial in electoral competition and party 
politics, both in national and local political systems. From this perspective, differences in local 
competition and party systems are essential to an explanation of local redistributive efforts. 
Peterson (1981), however, claims that redistributive policies are excluded from the local agenda 
because they impair local economic prosperity. These policies are therefore not conceived as 
instruments in the vote-maximizing strategies of local political parties. In this paper, hypotheses 
on the impact of party competition and party politics on  local redistribution are formulated and 
tested on data for 342 Dutch municipalities. The results show that, contrary to what would be 
expected from Peterson’s perspective, municipal redistributive efforts were related to electoral 
competitiveness and the party system. The proposed model, however, proved to be unsatisfac- 
tory in accurately predicting the direction of the effects of these explanatory variables. These 
results suggest that, rather than abandoning the study of local redistribution as a non-issue in 
subnational politics, an effort should be made to develop a better theoretical understanding of 
the ways in which competition and party politics shape these policies. 
Introduction 
With the introduction of universal suffrage in western democracies it was 
hypothesized that the political equality inherent in the one-man-one-vote 
rule would affect social and economic equality. The logic underlying of this 
this argument implies that politicians, being dependent on the popular vote, 
will adopt policies to attract the support of as many voters as possible: ‘Thus 
the equality of franchise in a democratic society creates a tendency for 
government action to equalize incomes by redistributing them from a few 
wealthy persons to many less wealthy ones’ (Downs 1957: 198). These trans- 
fers of ‘income’ may be either in money or in kind (as when a government 
delivers free goods or services). Redistributive policies, therefore, are 
government programmes in which the net income (the balance of all benefits 
and costs, both in money and in kind) of lower income groups relative to 
more prosperous groups is increased. 
In the analysis of state and local policies, propositions similar to  the 
Downsian redistribution hypothesis have been advanced. Redistributive is- 
sues are thought to be crucial in subnational politics too. In an assessment 
of studies of state and local politics, for example, Jacob & Lipsky stress the 
general importance of redistributive policies: ‘The distribution of benefits or 
sanctions is perhaps the most significant output dimension for political scien- 
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tists, since much of the conflict preceding adoption of a program is not about 
whether it should be embarked upon but who will pay and who will benefit’ 
(Jacob & Lipsky 1971: 19). In this statement, the key issues in both national 
and subnational politics concern the classic Laswellian questions of who gets 
what, when and how? Furthermore. in analyses of state and local redistribu- 
tion, Downs’ redistribution hypothcsis is, implicitly or explicitly, typically 
taken as a starting-point. Gray, for example, in a paper on state policies, 
puts it this way: “‘Have-nots” constitute the largest pool of potential voters. 
Party-leaders, recognizing competition as a threat to the attainment of office 
will adopt a policy-strategy directed towards the ‘have-nots” (Gray 1976: 
239-240). Along these and similar lines, many scholars from both the US 
and Europe have conducted studies focussing on the politics of redistribution 
in subnational government. Almost all of these studies, in one way or an- 
other, hypothesize effects of party competition and party politics on the level 
of local redistribution (as with the hypothesis that, the more intense party- 
competition, the more redistributive local policies will tend to be) .’ 
In his provocative book City Limir.s (1981), the American political scientist 
Peterson challenges this prevalent approach. According to Peterson (1981: 
22)  ‘cities seek to improve their market position, their attractiveness as a 
locale for economic activity’. If the local economy prospers, unemployment 
is low, labour is scarce and wages increase, land values rise, tax revenues 
increase and local government is therefore able to provide a wider range of 
goods and services. Local politicians, motivated by a sense of community 
responsibility, try to promote the market position of their municipality by 
adopting policies conducive to economic growth. On the other hand, they 
try to avoid policies that impair the city’s economic interests. Redistributive 
policies, providing benefits for low-income citizens which are payed for by 
taxes on the wealthy, are held to damage the city’s economic prospects. 
Peterson concludes that: ‘[r]edistribution is seldom a significant aspect of 
local government operations, and therefore the issue is largely excluded from 
the local political agenda’ (1981: 167). In other words, redistribution is 
essentially ‘beyond the city limits’.’ Therefore, Peterson’s argument implies 
that national and subnational politics are qualitatively different. Whereas 
national politics is largely about redistributive issues, these matters are essen- 
tially non-issues in local and regional government. Furthermore, if Peterson’s 
‘unpolitics of redistribution’ thesis is correct, subnational redistributive ef- 
forts - if these are made at all - are not likely to be instruments in the vote- 
maximizing strategies of local and regional political parties. From this point 
of view, intermunicipal variations in party competition are expected to have 
no impact on variations in the redistributiveness of municipal policies. 
Whether the prevalent ‘redistribution’ approach or Peterson’s ‘unpolitics 
of redistribution’ thesis is more appropriate is essentially an empirical matter. 
In Section 1 of this paper I outline a theoretical model that is closely related 
to the prevalent ‘redistribution’ models. Hypotheses on the politics of redis- 
tribution in local government are deduced from this model. In Section 4 
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these hypotheses are tested empirically on the basis of data on 342 Dutch 
m~nicipali t ies.~ Before the results are presented, however, the measurement 
of the dependent variables are discussed (Section 2) and the statistical model 
employed in this study are introduced (Section 3). The paper is concluded 
by a discussion of the consequences of the results of this study for the 
prevalent ‘redistribution’ approach, and for Peterson’s alternative. 
1. A simple model of redistributive policies 
Basic elements of the model 
The model developed in this section is in many respects congenial to Downs’ 
Economic Theory of Democracy (1957). Notwithstanding the similarities, 
however, the model differs from the Downsian approach in its assumptions 
on the motivation of political parties. Downs assumes that a political party 
can be considered as a unitary actor. This actor, according to Downs, is 
motivated by the rewards of elective office. In order to achieve this goal, 
the party has to be electorally successful. This reasoning leads Downs to a 
fundamental hypothesis: ‘parties formulate policies in order to win elections, 
rather than win elections in order to formulate policies’ (Downs 1957: 28). 
Downs’ model implies that vote maximization is an appropriate goal for 
parties under all circumstances. It is, however, difficult to understand why a 
party enjoying a solid and stable majority of, say, 75 percent in a jurisdiction 
should try as hard to increase its share of the vote as a party in a neck- 
and-neck-race. 
Breton (1974) and Frey & Lau (1968) develop models based on a more 
complex behavioural assumption which takes such considerations into ac- 
count. According to Breton for example, the utility income of a party de- 
pends on two factors. First, it depends on whether the party is able to win 
the number or percentage of votes (n)  it wants to achieve in the election. 
Second, its utility income depends on the achievement of the party’s ultimate 
goals (such as power or money, but also the satisfaction derived from the 
possibility to achieve personal political ideals). Breton assumes that parties 
maximize this utility function in such a way as to be sure that n does not fall 
below a threshold value n*. Frey & Lau (1968) develop a similar model. 
They assume that, once the party’s expected share of the vote exceeds a 
threshold value, a party will start to pursue its policy preferences. The 
approach these authors have chosen is not completely convincing however. 
These models are characterized by a marked discontinuity in the marginal 
utility of the expected share of the vote. All election results in which n 2 n* 
are equally satisfactory. And, all results in which n < n* are equally unsatis- 
factory. In the model proposed here, a party’s appreciation of election results 
is not of such an all-or-nothing nature. It will be assumed that the economic 
law of decreasing marginal utility (Gossens’ first law) applies to party vote 
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shares as well. With an increasing share of the vote, the marginal utility of 
an extra one percent vote share, decreases. This is reflected in a decreasing 
priority of vote maximization and. following Frey & Lau, an increasing 
priority for the pursuit of the party’s policy  preference^.^ 
An important reason to expect policy preferences to play a major role in 
determining party behaviour is the dependence of the elites in European 
mass-parties on a large rank-and-file.s Following Laver & Schofield (1990: 
24), I assume that ‘[tlhe general rule is that the rank-and-file, more concerned 
with ideology and less in line for the other spoils of office, tend to resent 
the policy compromises necessary to enter coalition and hence to oppose 
them’. This ‘general rule’ also applies to compromises in the party’s policy 
strategy for the sake of its electoral competitiveness (cf. Robertson 1976: 
31-33, 39; Hirschman 1970: 72). This is not to say that the elite is bound 
hand and foot by the activists. Party members are aware that the realization 
of their preferences depends on the electoral success of their candidates. 
Within an ‘area of acceptance’ they will be willing to compromise in order 
to secure success at the polls. It seems plausible that the willingness of the 
rank-and-file to compromise will be smaller when the need to compete for 
votes is lower. On the other hand, once competition is keen, the necessity 
for parties to adjust their policies to the electoral preferences is higher and 
their willingness to compromise should accordingly be greater. 
This reformulation of the Downsian model results in at least two interesting 
general propositions. 
Proposition A 
The closer electoral competition, the more party policies will be adjusted to 
match electoral preferences on these policies. 
Proposition B 
The less severe electoral competition, the more party policies will be adjusted 
to match the party’s preferences on these policies. 
In these propositions electoral competition is a variable conditioning the 
effects on government policies of the policy preferences of both electorate 
and parties. 
Towards testable hypotheses on redistributive policies 
These general hypotheses are rather imprecise. They leave several important 
questions on electoral preferences, party preferences and electoral competi- 
tion unanswered. Two questions relate to the local electorate. First, what are 
the preferences of local electorates? Second, since popular attitudes are 
probably not unanimous, the question concerns whose preferences count for 
parties when there is a close competition for votes? 
In order to answer the first question, an assumption has to be made about 
the motives underlying electoral behaviour. In line with Downs (1957: 36) it 
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is assumed that voters seek to maximize the ‘streams of utility derived from 
government activity’. Furthermore, voters are not supposed to be motivated 
primarily by the general long term interests of their community. A voter is 
assumed to have more intense feelings about his personal (economic) well- 
being or the situation of the social group with whom he identifies, than about 
the general (economic) condition of his community (cf. Downs 1957: 68, or 
Renaud & Schram 1986: 345). Hence, it seems plausible that ‘the economic 
bases for party affiliation must be sought in [the] area of income redistribu- 
tion’ (Stigler, 1973: 167).6 I assume furthermore, that the preferences of a 
voter for redistributive policies are inversely related to the level of his in- 
come. Low income voters prefer a higher level of redistribution than high 
income voters.’ From this assumption it follows that, at the aggregate level, 
a strong association will exist between the municipal distribution of personal 
incomes and the distribution of voter preferences for redistributive policies. 
For this reason it seems legitimate to use the distribution of personal income 
as an approximation of the distribution of electoral preferences for redistribu- 
tive policies. The shape of the personal income distribution is well docu- 
mented. Generally, these distributions are single-peaked and skewed to the 
right. 
But whose preferences count? In order to answer this question, a short 
exposition on the dynamics of electoral competition in multiparty systems is 
inevitable. In these systems there are two main forces driving the platforms 
of competing parties towards the centre of single-peaked distributions of 
electoral preferences. First, it is clear that moving closer to the centre of 
such a single-peaked distribution, a party will be able to win more votes than 
it will loose by alienating its off-centre support. Second, as Laver (1981: 136) 
points out, the anticipation of post-electoral coalitions leads to a ‘tendency 
for the range of policies advocated in a multiparty system to contract at 
either extreme of the scale’. Parties generally do not advocate extreme 
policies because this would bring them in a rather uncomfortable position 
after the election. A party advocating extreme policies is either bound to 
keep its pre-election promises and be unacceptable as a partner in post- 
election coalitions. Or,  it is bound to make large concessions on its extreme 
pre-election platform in order to become an acceptable partner, and thereby 
loose its credibility with the electorate. It should be emphasized however 
that these two centripetal forces do not lead to a complete convergence of 
parties towards the centre. An important force inhibiting complete conver- 
gence is the presence of the party’s rank-and-file. These policy-oriented party 
members restrain the ‘mobility’ of party-platforms. 
Nevertheless, these two centripetal forces confer a special status on the 
voters near the centre of the distribution of electoral preferences. Especially 
if competition is close, parties will be keen to be as responsive as possible 
to the preferences of the voters near the centre. As stated before, the 
municipal distribution of personal incomes is an acceptable approximation 
328 
RPF 
CPN RK SGP 
P;P PFiR P P A  D Y  CYA V r  G Y  
Fig. 1. Ranking of Dutch political parties on empirical policy-scale. 
CDA - Christian Democratic Appeal; CPN - Communists; D66 - Democrats 66; GPV - 
Reformed Political Association; PPR - Political Radicals; PSP - Pacifist Socialist; PVDA - 
Social Democrats (Labour); RK - Roman Catholic Independents: RPF - Reformational Political 
Federation; SGP - Reformed Political Party: VVD - Conservative-Liberal Party. 
of the distribution of the local electoral preferences for redistributive policies. 
The median is employed as a measure of centrality for the municipal distribu- 
tion of personal income.' 
Having considered electoral preferences, I now turn to several questions 
concerning policy preferences of political parties. First, it needs to be known 
whar the preferences of the different local political parties are. Second, a 
closer look at the local decision making process is necessary to determine 
which parties are able to influence local policy decisions according to their 
preferences, to what extent. 
Collecting complete data on the actual preferences of all of the local party 
branches in 342 municipalities was, for obvious reasons, beyond the scope 
of this research. Therefore, an assumption had to be made about these 
preferences. In this paper it is assumed that the ranking of the preferences 
for redistributive policies of the local branches of various national political 
parties in each of the municipalities in the sample is identical to the ranking 
of the policy preferences of the national political parties. The ranking pre- 
sented in Figure 1, will be employed." The more to the left on this left-right 
continuum a party is positioned, the more it is in favour of highly redistribu- 
tive policies. 
Turning to the local decision making process, the voting power of parties, 
defined as the degree to which a party is able to determine the outcome of 
roll-call votes in a voting body such as the municipal council is crucially 
important. The voting power of a party depends not only on its relative 
number of seats but also on its opportunities to form majority coalitions 
(see e.g. Brams 1975; 175). These opportunities are to an important extent 
determined by the strategies parties choose. Referring to the earlier dis- 
cussion of party behaviour it is plausible that parties will form coalitions that 
are not needlessly heterogeneous with regard to the policies advocated by 
their members. First, parties prefer relatively homogeneous coalitions be- 
cause it is relatively easy to reach compromises that minimize the damage 
post-election compromising is bound to inflict upon the credibility of the 
parties with their electorate (Laver 1981: 135-137). Second, for essentially 
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the same reasons, parties are thus able to sustain the support of their policy- 
oriented rank-and-file. 
In this paper a coalition is defined as ‘relatively homogeneous’ if it is what 
formal coalition theorists call a coalition of minimum range. A coalition is 
of minimum range if, assuming that parties are ordered on a left-right con- 
tinuum, it has a minimum ordinal distance between its rightmost and leftmost 
member.” On the basis of the party positions in Figure 1 for example, the 
coalitions {PvdA,D66,CDA), {PvdA,CDA} and {CDA,VVD} are of mini- 
mum range, but the coalition {PvdA,D66,VVD) is not. If parties tend to 
form only these relatively homogeneous coalitions, spectacular differences 
between the distributions of seats and effective voting power may occur. 
These variations originate from differences in the strategic options to parties. 
In many voting-bodies the distribution of seats is such that the parties in the 
centre of the left-right spectrum are essential members (members whose 
defection would imply that the coalition would lose its required majority) of 
‘minimum range’ coalition with both the parties to their left and with those 
to their right. Parties on the left or on the right of the spectrum, in contrast, 
are essential only in ‘minimum range’ coalitions including the centre party. 
In this paper, it is assumed that the bargaining power of a party in the 
negotiations preceding the decisive vote, and thereby its potential to influence 
policy decisions, is proportional to the number of times this party is an 
essential member of a majority minimum range coalition. This assumption 
underlies our index of voting power (VP), which is defined as: 
VP = k i / C  ki 
in which ki is the number of (majority) minimum range coalitions in 
which party i is an essential member.” 
In this study, the analysis of the effects of voting power and party preferences 
on local policies focuses on two of the three major Dutch political parties, 
the social democrats (PvdA) and the conservative party (VVD). This is 
because the voting power indices of the three main parties (including the 
CDA) typically sum to unity and the inclusion of the CDA is thus superflu- 
ous. l 2  
It now is possible to phrase more precise hypotheses based on general 
propositions A and B above. With regard to electoral preferences it has been 
argued that, especially when competition is close, voters in the centre of the 
distribution of preferences are crucially important. As a measure of the 
central tendency of the distribution of preferences, the median was proposed. 
Furthermore, it was argued that the distribution of income could serve as an 
approximation of the distribution of electoral preference for redistributive 
policies. The higher a voter’s income, the less supportive his or her attitudes 
to redistributive policies. The first hypothesis is thus: 
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Hypothesis 1) The redistributiveness of municipal policies will be higher, the 
lower the median income in the municipality. This negative relation will be 
the stronger, the higher electoral Competition in the municipality. 
With regard to the policy preferences of the political parties, two more 
hypotheses can be formulated. If the voting power of either the PvdA or the 
VVD in a municipal council is relatively high, as measured by the index of 
voting power (VP), then the impact of that party's preferences on the out- 
come of policy decisions is considerable. In combination with what has been 
said about the location of these parties on the left-right scale it is expected 
that, all other things (notably the closeness of electoral competition) being 
equal, the higher the voting power of the social-democratic PvdA, the higher 
the level of redistributive government policies will be. Likewise, the voting 
power of the conservative-liberal VVD is expected to be inversely related to 
the redistributive efforts. The opportunities for a party to exploit its voting 
power fully however, depend on the level of electoral competition. As has 
been noted before, whenever electoral competition is intense, parties will 
have to make more concessions to the preferences of the electorate than 
they will when competition is less strong. In the latter case, parties have 
more room to pursue their ideological preferences. The preceding arguments 
lead to the formulation of two additional hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2) The redistributiveness of municipal policies will be higher, the 
higher the voting power of the social-democratic party ( P v d A )  in a municipal 
council. This positive relation will be stronger the lower the electoral competi- 
tion in a municipality. 
Hypothesis 3) The redistributiveness of municipal policies will be lower, the 
higher the voting p o  wer of the conser\lative-liberal party ( W D )  in a municipal 
council. This negative relation will be stronger the lower the electoral competi- 
tion in a 
Electoral competition is a conditioning variable in all three hypotheses. It is 
seen here as the degree to which a political party is able to formulate policies 
independent of the preferences of the local electorate and other political 
parties. Electoral competition is determined by both static and dynamic 
factors (cf. Stigler 1983: 34). A static factor stimulating competition is the 
effective number of parties. This number is determined by both the actual 
number of parties and by their relative size, in terms of the percentage of 
the total vote a t t r a ~ t e d . ' ~  A relatively low effective number of parties leads 
to a low level of competition. In such a situation there is a predominance of 
one or two parties that are likely to have a firm grip on local political 
decision-making. Collusion to avoid the consequences of competition is 
more likely when the effective number of parties is smaller (cf. Olson 1965: 
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43-52). At the same time, these parties will give a relatively low priority to 
vote maximization, given a decreasing marginal utility of votes. A second, 
dynamic, factor related to competition is electoral volutiliry. l5 Electoral vola- 
tility is defined as the average change in the voting shares of parties in 
consecutive elections. The lower volatility, the more stable a party’s ‘market- 
share’, and the less it need to worry about mobilizing the vote. For these 
reasons, a higher level of volatility implies more intense electoral competi- 
tion. 
2. The measurement of ‘redistributiveness’ 
In selecting the two policy areas considered in this study, two redistributive 
policies were selected, both characterized by substantial municipal autonomy 
vis-a-vis central government. l 6  
The first is housing policy and more specifically housing allocation policies 
in the council and privately rented sector. In most Dutch municipalities the 
management of the rented sector is the primary responsibility of independent 
housing associations (the privately rented sector is only of marginal impor- 
tance). The primary task of the housing associations is to take care for 
adequate and affordable accommodation for low income groups. Allocation 
policies, a major responsibility of these associations, determine the access of 
various groups to the council sector. In this area, as in the privately rented 
sector, social objectives and considerations of economically sound housing 
management are often difficult to reconcile. Those ‘most in need’ are not 
always attractive tenants from a housing management perspective. Because 
of their relevance for the housing opportunities of low-income groups, many 
local authorities have set up policies to control the registration and allocation 
rules of the housing associations and private landlords. Municipal registration 
and allocation criteria generally emphasize social, medical and other ‘need- 
oriented’ criteria. For the purpose of this research a scale has been con- 
structed to measure the degree of municipal control over the allocation 
policies of the housing associations and private landlords. l 7  These municipal 
controls are meant to increase the housing opportunities of low-income 
groups at the expense of more wealthy citizens. Thereby the city becomes 
more attractive for low-income groups, while at the same time it becomes 
more difficult for more prosperous people to  find accommodation in the city. 
The second policy area relates to local taxation. The Dutch local real 
estate tax has two rates, one for owners and one for users (mostly tenants). 
Under the assumption that owners of real estate are generally wealthier than 
non-owners, some local authorities employ these rates to redistribute wealth. 
They fix relatively high rates for owners and low or moderate rates for users 
of real estate. The ratio of owner and user-rates (the tax rates ratio) indicates 
the redistributiveness of the local real estate tax. ’* 
3. The statistical analysis of conditional relations 
The main methodological problem in this research is the statistical analysis 
of the conditional relations between the variables in the hypotheses. For 
instance, in Hypothesis 1 the effects of median income on the dependent 
variable, are hypothesized to depend upon the value of the level of electoral 
competition. The standard linear-additive regression model is inappropriate 
for testing such conditional hypotheses, since in this statistical model the 
effects of the regressors are assumed to be independent. A widely used 
method for handling conditional relations, often referred to as ‘interactions’, 
is the addition of a ‘multiplicative’ term to the regression equation.” In the 
most simple case of a conditional rclation between two regressors (X, and 
X,) this method implies that a multiplicative term, the product of XI  and 
X2, is added to the regression equation. As becomes clear when Equation 2 
is rewritten as 2a, the effect of XI (e.g. median income) on Y (e.g. the tax 
rate ratio) depends on the value of Xz (e.g. electoral volatility). 
Y = a + bl * XI + b2 * X2 + bi  * (XI * X,) + E 
Y = [a + bz * X,] + [bl + b3 :ir X,] * XI + E 
Friedrich (1982) has demonstrated that, once the conditional nature of this 
equation is recognized, the interpretation of the coefficients in Equation (2a) 
is straightforward. The first term between square brackets in Equation (2a) 
is the intercept of a function representing the relation between Y and XI .  
This term gives the value of the dependent variable if XI equals zero.” The 
second term between brackets represents the ‘slope’ of the relation between 
Y and XI  (or the ‘effect’ of XI on Y). This second term is in part determined 
by the value of X,. The coefficient b ,  represents the effect on Y of a change 
in XI if and only if X2 equals zero, while b3 gives the change in the effect 
of XI on Y due to a change in X,. The interpretation of coefficients in 
equations with more than one conditioning variable and/or more indepen- 
dents is not inherently different from this simple model. This will become 
evident in the discussion of the results in Section 4. 
4. Results 
The regression results relevant to the tests of the hypotheses for each of the 
dependent variables (Y,) are contained in the Table 1.*’ The estimates of 
the model coefficients are grouped in such a way as to demonstrate the 
conditional effects of the electoral preferences (median income; X,) and the 
voting power of the PVDA (X,) and the VVD (X,) clearly. In the following 
subsections the implications of these regression results for the three hypoth- 
eses developed in Section 1 will be discussed.22 
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Table 1. The conditional effects of median income, voting power PvdA and voting power VVD 
on the control of housing allocation and the tax rate ratio 
Equation for YI Equation for Y2 
Intercept [-2.81 +2.68 * X, -0.01 * X,] [-0.93 -0.13 * & +0.004 * X,] 
(3.51) (3.54) (0.58) (4.59) 
Conditional [1.99 -1.18 * & +0.004 * Xs] * X I  [0.89 1-0.04 * X4 -0.0016 * XS] * X I  
effect XI (1.88) (3.78) (3.84) (2.64) (0.42) (4.35) 
Conditional [-0.08 +0.01* X4 +O.ooOo5 * X,] * X2 [-O.oaS + O N 5  * X -O.ooOol* X,] * X2 
effect X2 (3.50) (2.52) (2.15) (1.69) (3.32) (1.80) 
Conditional (-0.004 +0.02 * X., -0.oooO8 * X,] * X, [-0.017 +0.007 * X4 -0.ooOOl * X,] * X3 
effect XJ (0.13) (2.82) (2.51) (2.32) (3.76) (1.63) 
R$, = 0.17 
Number of weighted cases = 527 
R:dj = 0.16 
Number of weighted cases = 460 
Y, = allocation control; Y2 = tax rate ratio; XI = median income; X2 = PVDA voting power; 
X3 = W D  voting power; X4 = effective number of parties; XI = electoral volatility. 
Hypothesis 1:  The effects of median income. Hypothesis 1 states that the 
negative relation between median income (XI) and the redistributiveness of 
municipal policies will be more negative when competition is keen than if 
competition is relatively less close. The second row of Table 1 (conditional 
effect of XI) shows how median income affects the redistributiveness of local 
policies, and how this effect is conditioned by electoral competition. Relevant 
t-values are specified between brackets below the equations. It is clear that 
the effect of median income on the two dependent variables changes with 
changing combinations of the values of both indicators for electoral competi- 
tion (X, and X5). 
On theoretical grounds it was expected that the hypothesized negative 
conditional effect of median income on the control of allocation policies (Yl) 
would be stronger when competition is more intense. From Table 1 it is 
evident that both the number of effective parties and electoral volatility 
significantly affect the impact of median income on housing allocation con- 
trol. The sign of the coefficient for the effective number of parties (X,) is 
negative as predicted. The effect of electoral volatility (X,) is positive, not 
negative as hypothesized. 
With regard to the tax-rate ratio (Y2), it was also expected that the 
hypothesized negative effect of median income on the redistributiveness of 
taxation would be stronger, the more intense was party competition. The 
results in Table 1 show that the coefficient of the effective number of parties 
(X,) is insignificant, indicating that the impact of this variable on the relation 
between median income and the tax rate ratio is negligible. Electoral vola- 
tility (X,), however, significantly affects the relation of median income and 
the tax-rate ratio. Moreover, the sign of the coefficient is negative as ex- 
pected. 
From these results it has to be concluded that there is only scant evidence 
in support of the first hypothesis. The effect of median income on the 
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redistributiveness of two local policies proved to be dependent on the inten- 
sity of electoral competition. But, of the four coefficients, only two were 
both in the direction predicted by the model developed in Section 1, and 
significant, 
So far I have concentrated on the impact of competition on the conditional 
effect of median income and said nothing about the direction and strength 
of this conditional effect. This effect can be computed by substituting specific 
values for X4 and X5 in the relevant part (i.e. the second row of Table 1 of 
the two regression equations). If this is done it becomes clear that the 
conditional effect of median income is not consistently negative as was hypo- 
thesized. Empirically, a significant negative relation was only found for speci- 
fic combinations of values of the ‘conditioning’  variable^.,^ Not only the 
strength but also the direction of the relation between median income and 
the dependent variable, was affected by electoral competition. 
Hypothesis 2: The effects of PVDA voting power. Hypothesis 2 states that, 
the stronger the voting power of the social democratic PVDA (X,), the more 
redistributive that local policies (Y,) will be. This positive relation is expected 
to be stronger when electoral Competition is relatively weak. Therefore, it 
is expected that the coefficients of the competition variables in the equations 
representing the conditional effect of PVDA voting power on the dependent 
variables (third row in Table 1) will be negative. The results in Table 1 clearly 
indicate that both the number of effective parties and electoral volatility 
significantly affect the impact of PVDA voting power on the control of 
housing allocation (Yl) .  But, contrary to what was expected, the most strict 
controls are found where a relatively powerful PVDA is under tough compe- 
tition (statistically, the signs of the coefficients are positive and not negative 
as hypothesized). The results for the tax-rate ratio (Y,) do not conform to 
theoretical expectations either. Although the sign of the coefficient for elec- 
toral volatility is negative as expected, this estimate is insignificant. The 
effect of the number of effective parties is significant, but the coefficient 
representing this effect has the ‘wrong’ sign. 
The overall picture looks much the same as for Hypothesis 1. Although 
the effect of PVDA voting power on both redistributive policies under study 
is conditioned by at least one aspect of electoral competition, the predictive 
power of the theoretical model developed in Section 1 proved to be poor. The 
sign of four coefficients was predicted. Empirically, none of these predictions 
proved to be correct. These unexpected results also affect the accuracy of 
the prediction with regard to the hypothesized positive conditional effect of 
PVDA voting power on the redistributiveness of local policies. It was ex- 
pected that only the strength of this relation would vary with the level of 
electoral competition. Empirically, however, not only the strength but also 
the sign of the effect of PVDA voting power varied for various combinations 
of values for the two competition variables. The expected positive effect only 
occurred for specific combinations of values of the two competition variables. 
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Hypothesis 3: The effects of VVD voting power .  According to Hypothesis 3 
the redistributiveness of municipal policies will be lower, the higher the 
voting power of the conservative-liberal party (VVD; X,) in the municipal 
council. This negative relation is expected to be stronger, the less intense is 
electoral competition. Table 1 (third row, equation for Y,) allows an empiri- 
cal assessment of this hypothesis for the case of the control of allocation 
policies. As was predicted theoretically, the effect of VVD voting power on 
the control of allocation policies becomes less negative, the higher the effec- 
tive number of parties (X4). Moreover, the coefficient of this variable is 
significant. The effect of electoral volatility (X,) is significant as well. But 
this effect runs in the ‘wrong’ direction. 
The effects of party competition on the relation of VVD voting power 
and the tax rate-ratio are also presented in Table 1 (third row, equation for 
Y2). It is clear from the table that the effective number of parties (X,) 
conditions the effect of the VVD voting power on the dependent variable as 
hypothesized. The coefficient of this conditioning variable is positive and 
significant. The effect of electoral volatility (X5), however, contradicts the 
theoretical predictions. This variable has a negative, though insignificant, 
coefficient. 
All-in-all, Hypothesis 3 is not corroborated. Electoral competition in both 
cases conditions the effect of the VVD voting power on the redistributiveness 
of municipal policies. But the pattern of the effects of both electoral volatility 
and the effective number of parties does not generally conform to theoretical 
expectations. The signs of four coefficients for the conditioning variables 
were predicted and only two of these predictions proved to be correct. Partly 
due to these unexpected results, the hypothesized negative effect of VVD 
voting power on the redistributiveness of local policies is not found either. 
This expectation was only borne out for specific combinations of values of 
the two competition variables. 
Concluding remarks 
According to many political scientists (re)distributive issues are at the heart 
of politics. In this vein, many students of subnational politics have focused 
on the politics of redistribution as their central concern. A popular hypothesis 
among these scholars states that ‘office-seeking’ local politicians compete for 
electoral popularity by offering the relatively numerous less well-to-do speci- 
fic benefits at the expense of more affluent citizens. Peterson (1981) has 
challenged this approach. According to him redistributive issues are essen- 
tially the business of central government. In the local political arena these 
issues are conspicuous by their absence. He claims that local politicians 
will refrain from major redistributive efforts lest they lose their edge in 
intermunicipal economic competition. 
This paper has evaluated a number of propositions on the politics of 
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redistribution in local government. The model from which these propositions 
were derived starts from the assumption that redistributive issues are key 
elements in the politics of local government. An attempt was made to explain 
intermunicipal variations in redistributive policies on  the basis of differences 
in the competitiveness of local party systems. An unequivocal corroboration 
of these hypotheses would cast serious doubts on the Peterson thesis. 
Empirical research in Great Britain seems to support the main thrust of 
the logic underlying this model. Sharpe & Newton (1984: 176-204), on the 
basis of an extensive empirical study. reject Peterson’s model and stress the 
importance of ideological and party system variables. First, they find that 
Labour domination of municipal politics has a significant (though not very 
strong) association with ‘redistributive and socially ameliorative services’. 
Second, their research lends support to the idea that, the more competitive 
the party system, the more parties are competing for the median voter and 
the more cautious they are in pursuing their party ideology. Conversely, 
once competition is less severe, parties are more inclined to follow party 
ideology in shaping municipal policies. 
The theoretical model presented in Section 1 builds on similar notions. 
Three hypotheses derived from this model were tested empirically on data 
for 342 Dutch municipalities. The Dutch results did not corroborate the 
hypotheses. Too be sure, the redistributiveness of municipal policies was 
affected by the electoral preferences (median income) and the voting power 
of social democrats (PVDA) and liberals (WD) .  Furthermore, these effects 
proved to be conditional rather than general in nature: the relationships 
varied with the closeness of electoral competition. These findings clearly 
suggest that party politics and political competition, contrary to what 
Peterson suggests, do affect the redistributiveness of municipal policies. 
Nevertheless, the performance of the theoretical model is to be considered 
rather poor. The major defect of this model was its inability to explain the 
ways in which electoral volatility and the effective number of parties affect 
the strength and direction of these relations. In all, 12 predictions on the 
effect of the two competition variables were made. In nine of these cases a 
significant conditioning effect was found empirically, but in only four cases 
did this significant effect go in the expected direction. This is by all standards 
a poor success rate. 
All-in-all, the findings in this research pose a theoretical dilemma. On the 
one hand, it is obvious that the support for the proposed ‘redistribution’ 
model is scant. But, on the other hand, this failure should not too readily 
be interpreted as supportive of Peterson’s ‘unpolitics of redistribution’-argu- 
ment. Some of the findings in this study cast doubt on his thesis as well. 
Whereas, for instance, it seems plausible that intermunicipal economic com- 
petition would tend to level out major differences in the redistributiveness 
of municipal policies, we found rather substantial intermunicipal variations 
in redistributiveness.24 Besides, the present study clearly shows that the 
competitiveness of the party-system affects (as part of a conditional effect) 
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the level of municipal redistribution. These findings, even though they do 
not lend support to the ‘redistribution model’ proposed earlier either, are 
difficult to reconcile with Peterson’s thesis. This is because intermunicipal 
variations in party-competition are expected in Peterson’s model to have no 
impact on variations in the redistributiveness of municipal policies. The 
findings of this study are consistent with those of scholars (such as Sharpe 
& Newton 1984), who expect intermunicipal differences in redistribution to 
originate in the competitiveness of the local party system and the resulting 
variations in the conditions confronting politicians competing for the popular 
vote. These results suggest that, rather than abandoning the study of local 
redistribution as a non-issue in subnational politics, an effort should be 
made to develop a better theoretical understanding of the ways in which 
competition and party politics shape these policies. 
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Notes 
1. This redistribution hypothesis builds on earlier work by Key & Lockard. A pioneer study in 
this tradition is Dawson & Robinson (1963). Some examples of later studies on  subnational 
redistribution are Cnudde & McCrone (1969), Fry & Winters (1970). Lineberry (1977), 
Plotnick & Winters (1985). and Hoggart (1987). 
2. Peterson concedes that some local authorities with a rather strong tax base can afford some 
redistribution. But cities with relatively many poor and needy citizens, and a correspondingly 
weak fiscal base, simply cannot afford substantial redistributive efforts. What is more 
important, however, is that neither type of city has an ‘economic’ incentive to pursue 
redistributive goals. 
3. For this research data on 342 Dutch municipalities are used. These 342 cases form a 
disproportionally stratified and systematic sample of the population of 810 Dutch munici- 
palities in 1979, the year in which the sample was taken. 
4. This conceptualizatlon implies as Stigler (1972) has argued, that the 51 percent result is not 
seen as marking a special discontinuity. Furthermore, this model starts from rather different 
assumptions than Peterson’s model. Peterson employs a model based on essentially benevol- 
ent politicians, motivated by a sense of responsibility for their community. In contrast the 
model developed here assumes that parties are motivated by a mixture of ‘office-seeking’ 
and ‘policy-seeking’. 
5. The elite cannot ignore the rank-and-file for two reasons. Firstly, the membership nominates 
the candidates. Secondly, the support of the party membership is essential in the conduct 
of a modern election campaign. 
6. Of course these assumptions mark a crucial difference with Peterson’s approach. In 
Peterson’s model voters are not short-sightedly pursuing their short-term interests in practic- 
ing ‘pocketbook-voting’, but are sensitive to the long-term economic interests of their 
community. 
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7. This formulation implies neither that low income voters prefer a complete levelling of 
incomes nor that high income recipients are totally opposed to any redistribution whatso- 
ever. First, the enthusiasm of low-incomc individuals is tempered because they realize the 
negative macro-economic effects of radical levelling. Second, there may be a more or less 
general consensus among citizens, including the well-to-do, that differences in personal 
incomes exceeding a certain level are socially unacceptable. This second argument implies 
that higher income groups, out of a sense of ‘public regardingness’, might support some 
redistribution of income, even though thcy will be the ones who will pay for such policies. 
This assumption is supported by Szirmai (1986: 97-98), who concludes on  Dutch data for 
1980 that ‘the lower the income category of a respondent, the stronger his tendency to 
equalize’. Nevertheless, and in line with the previous argument, Szirmai also finds that, 
even among the high income groups, there is support for a somewhat more modest level 
of income redistribution. 
8. This variable is defined operationally as the median of the distribution of personal income 
(before taxation) in the municipality in 1978. The mode of the distribution would have heen 
a better measure, since this is the point of the distribution where most of the voters are 
located. In the case of income distributions, however, as Comanor (1976) has shown, the 
distance between the mode and the median is generally relatively small. It should be 
emphasized that the selection of the median as the measure of centrality does not imply 
that I endorse the hypothesis that party programmes completely converge on the median. 
9. The construction of this empirical policy scale is based primarily on a survey by Van Schuur 
(1984, 1986) on  the belief systems of delegates to conferences of the four major Dutch 
parties (CDA, PvdA, VVD and D66). The political orientations of these delegates are 
dominated by the traditional left-right dimension. According to Van Schuur: ‘the left or 
“progressive” side of this continuum is associated with a desire to lessen inequality among 
people, regions and countries, and to  protect both those who are vulnerable and the 
environment. The right or “conservative” side is associated with a concern for safety, 
freedom of the individual, and the lessening of state control’ (1984: 212). Since, Van 
Schuur’s study relates only to the four major parties, I had to rely on additional information 
based on the content analyses of party platforms by Laver & Budge (as reported in Laver 
& Schofield 1990: 262) and expert judgments reported by Castles & Mair (1984) for the 
placement of the other parties. In addition, the position of the Roman Catholic independent 
parties was assumed to coincide with thc position of the CDA.  These local Catholic parties 
can be considered an integral part of the subculture of the dominant Catholic ‘zuil’ (Kuiper 
& Dittrich 1991: 58). A detailed report on the construction of this scale is available upon 
request. This ranking was used in the computation of an index of voting power (see below) 
as well. 
10. For details on  the concept of ‘range’ and ‘ordinal distance’, see D e  Swaan (1973: 92). In 
my analyses I followed the approach described by De Swaan. I n  these analyses both 
minimum range coalitions containing an unnecessary member (i.e. a member in the coalition 
that could be expelled from the coalition without making the coalition a losing one; such 
coalitions are often referred to  as connected minimum range coalitions) as well as minimum 
range coalitions without such an actor (unconnected minimum range) were admitted. 
11. This measure is based on  the so-called Banzhaf index. The original index (see Brams 1975: 
164-167) however, has been adjusted to take the assumed preference of parties for relatively 
homogeneous (minimum range) coalitions into account. 
12. At the 1978 elections D66 was only a minor political force (it commanded less than 2 
percent of the seats in Dutch municipal councils) 
13. It might he argued that the locus of local power is not the municipal council, but that local 
policies are essentially determined by the distribution of voting power in the municipal 
executive. When the local executive is not formed according to the traditional consociational 
‘rules’ (proportional representation) but in a majoritarian way, important differences in the 
distribution of voting power in the council and the executive might occur. Therefore, I 
computed voting power indices for the parties represented in the municipal executive as 
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well. Two versions of the hypotheses were tested, the version presented in this paper, and 
a variant based on the composition of the municipial executive. The results of both these 
tests were essentially the same. Therefore, I only present the results for the municipial 
council in this paper. 
14. This measure is formally defined as [l/Z(pf)], in which pi is the proportion of the total vote 
for party i (Laakso & Taagpera 1979: 4). It has a straightforward interpretation. If in a 
polity with four actual parties, one party has an enormous majority (say 95 percent) the 
number of effective parties will be almost equal to one. If on the other hand these four 
parties each attract 25 percent of the vote, the actual number of parties equals the effective 
number of parties. This index has been computed for each of the municipalities in my 
sample, on the basis of official results of the 1978 municipal elections. The pi’s refer to the 
proportion of the valid votes (not including abstentions) and was computed over all parties 
participating in the election. The official election statistics put votes cast for independent 
lists in two residual categories. If two or more parties belonging in the same residual 
category are participating in a municipality, this will result in an underestimation of the 
actual number of effective parties. 
15. Electoral volatility (cf. Pedersen 1983) is defined here as the average change in the pro- 
portion of total number of valid votes (not including abstentions) cast for a party bloc in 
the municipal elections of 1970, 1974 and 1978. Six party-blocs were distinguished - extreme 
left, centre left, Christian-democrats (including catholic independent lists), conservative 
liberal, extreme right and local independents. Blocs were used instead of separate parties 
in order to facilitate comparisons overtime. The average is computed for each of the 
municipalities in the sample on the basis of both four-year differences (1970-1974 and 1974- 
1978) as well as on the eight-year difference (1970-1978). Formally this measure is defined 
as: 
VOLATILITY (XS) = [IPi;7o - Pi:741 + Ipi:70 - Pi;741 + lPi:70 - pi:mI]/N *K 
in which Pi;7. = voting share of party-bloc i in the 197. municipal elections 
K = the number of elections (K = 3) 
N = the number of party-blocs (N = 6) 
16. In general Dutch local government enjoys only limited formal and fiscal autonomy (e.g. 
Hoogerwerf 1980). However, Dutch local government, more than elsewhere, is involved in 
the implementation of numerous central government policies in a wide variety of policy 
areas (cf. Toonen 1987, 1990; Denters, de Jong & Thomassen 1990). This general practice 
is referred to as co-governance (‘medebewind’). These co-governance arrangements in many 
instances allow for considerable de facto local autonomy (cf. Toonen 1987,1990). In general, 
municipal opportunities to affect the distribution of monetary income are limited (though 
not always negligible). The municipal potential to allocate benefits to low-income groups in 
all kinds of nonmonetary policies (that also fall under my definition of redistributive policies; 
see Introduction), however, is considerable. In conclusion, and to remove a source of 
possible misunderstandings, I would like to stress that this paper does not start from the 
assumption that most of the redistribution in Dutch society is through municipal policies. 
What I do claim is that municipalities have certain nontrivial powers that enable them to 
pursue redistributive policies in their own right. 
17. The six-point scale is constructed on the basis of five dichotomous items. These items form 
a strong Mokken scale (total scalability H, = 0.54; All coefficients for the scalibility of the 
items Hi > 0.40). For a detailed report on the construction of this scale I refer to Denters, 
1987: 260-262. The Mokken scaling procedure is described in Mokken (1970). The items, 
presented in increasing order of municipal control are: (a) Is the municipality informed 
about the conditions for registration as a househunter employed by housing associations? 
(b) Does the municipality enter into negotiations with housing associations to influence 
conditions for registration? (c) Does the municipality determine conditions for registration 
unilaterally? (d) Do housing associations and private landlords completely control the 
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allocation of cheap rented accomodation? (e) Is the allocation of all rented accomodation 
concentrated in the hands of the municipality? 
18. Notwithstanding the fact that local taxes comprise less than ten percent of municipal rev- 
enues, the local real estate tax is by far the most important of these local sources of revenue. 
I selected this area for two reasons. First, the real estate tax per capita is not inconsiderable 
in money terms and highly visible. The per capita burden of this tax, in 1979, varied between 
hfl. 36 and hfl. 248 (Coumans 1981: 40). Of course the burden per household will be 
substantially higher. For the real estate tax a specific tax assessment is sent to all tax payers 
once a year. This makes this tax highly visible. Second, previous research has indicated that 
redistributive motives play an important role in explaining the tax rate ratio (Coumans 
1981; De Looff 1980). 
19. An alternative to this method is to split up the sample into subgroups according to the 
scores of the municipalities on the conditional variables (in this context, two aspects of 
competition). This alternative method has two major drawbacks. Firstly, if the conditional 
variable is continuous (as our two conditional variables are) regression results might be 
heavily affected by the arbitrary decision on the selection of the cutting points. Secondly, 
if we want to test hypotheses on the simultaneous effects of two conditional variables, the 
sample would have to be split up in at least four, relatively small, subsamples. The method 
employed in this paper avoids both problems. An important objection against the multiplic- 
ative term is based on the observation that the multiplicative term (e.g. XI * X,) typically 
correlates highly with either or both of its constituent variables. Multicollinearity can lead 
to unstable estimates. In this research a special indirect estimation technique is employed 
to circumvent any problems due to multicollinearity. This method, which builds on the work 
of Smith & Sasaki (1979) and Tate (1984). was developed by Denters & Van Puijenbroek 
(1989). For the estimation of conditional regression models with this indirect method a 
computer program, INTERACT, was developed by R.A.G. van Puijenbroek. 
20. First, this intercept depends on the value of the coefficient a .  This coefficient a represents 
the value of Y if not only X I  but also Xz equals zero. Second this intercept depends on the 
value of X2. The size of the 'effect' of X2 on this intercept is represented by the coefficient 
b2. 
21. Because we do not have a simple random sample the use of statistical tests for inferential 
purposes is illegitimate. In this research I used test-statistics as - admittedly rather arbitrary - 
criteria for substantive significance. In the analyses the size of the t-values (a critical t-value 
of 2.00 or more) is used as such a criterion. This corresponds to the 2.5 percent significance 
level for a one-tailed t-test. This rather stringent criterion was adopted to compensate for 
the effects of a weighting procedure employed to correct for the underrepresentation of 
small municipalities in our disproportionally stratified sample. In the evaluation of the 
results I rely on the unstandardized regression coefficients and the standard errors of these 
estimates (remember: t-value is ratio of regression coefficient and its standard error) rather 
than on the R2. For the evaluation of theoretical predictions the squared multiple correlation 
coefficient is not very useful (cf. Achen 1977). 
22. Both regression models were controlled for major violations of the assumptions of the 
regression model (normal distribution of the residuals and homoscedasticy). Except for 
minor infringements no violations of the assumptions of normally distributed residuals and 
homoscedasticy were detected. After the removal of 1 case for the Y,-model, and 6 cases 
from the Y,-model, the regression results were robust. 
23. For the computation of the t-values for these conditional-effect estimates see Friedrich 
(1982). 
24. The coefficient of variation for the control of allocation was 0.56 (mean 2.55; standard 
deviation: 1.43) and 0.27 for the tax ratc ratio (mean: 1.43; standard deviation: 0.39). 
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